IT230 Economics of Information and Communication

Economics of Information and CommunicationUnit 110 min read

Info Economics: Definitions, Markets & Digital Value

Unit 1 of Economics of Information and Communication explores the core concepts of information economics—how information differs from traditional goods, its unique market characteristics, and its role in modern digital economies, with real-world examples from Nepal and global tech firms.

What is Information Economics?

Information economics is a branch of economics that studies how information is produced, distributed, and consumed, and how it affects market behavior, pricing, and efficiency. Unlike traditional goods (e.g., rice, clothes), information goods are intangible, non-rivalrous (one person’s use does not reduce another’s), and often have high fixed costs but low marginal costs. This unit introduces the foundational ideas that distinguish information from physical goods and explain why digital markets behave differently.

Key Definitions

Term Definition Example
Information Good Intangible product with no physical form, e.g., software, e-books, or news. WhatsApp messages, YouTube videos, or eSewa transaction records.
Non-Rivalry One user’s consumption does not prevent others from using it. A single download of a song can be shared infinitely without degradation.
Non-Excludability Difficult to prevent non-payers from accessing the good (public good characteristic). Free Wi-Fi in public spaces (though often restricted in practice).
Fixed vs. Marginal Cost High upfront costs (e.g., developing an app) but near-zero costs to replicate/distribute. Developing a mobile app (fixed) vs. sending it to 1M users (marginal).

How Information Differs from Traditional Goods

Information goods exhibit unique economic properties that traditional goods (e.g., wheat, cars) do not. Below is a comparison:

classDiagram
    class TraditionalGood {
        +Tangible
        +Rivalrous (consumption reduces availability)
        +Excludable (can restrict access)
        +High marginal cost per unit
        +Example: Rice, clothes
    }
    class InformationGood {
        +Intangible
        +Non-rivalrous (infinite copies possible)
        +Often non-excludable (hard to restrict)
        +Near-zero marginal cost
        +Example: Software, e-books, digital music
    }
    TraditionalGood --> "vs." InformationGood : Key Differences

Why Does This Matter?

  1. Pricing Challenges: Traditional goods use marginal cost pricing, but information goods face issues like price discrimination (e.g., freemium models in apps) or versioning (e.g., paid vs. ad-supported YouTube).
  2. Market Power: High fixed costs create natural monopolies (e.g., Google’s dominance in search). Regulators must intervene to prevent abuse.
  3. Network Effects: The more users an information good has, the more valuable it becomes (e.g., WhatsApp’s utility grows with each new user).

The Role of Information in Markets

Information is not just a product—it is a key input in economic decisions. Poor or asymmetric information leads to market failures, while better information improves efficiency.

Real-World Example: eSewa and Transaction Information

eSewa, Nepal’s leading digital payment platform, relies on information symmetry (both buyer and seller have equal access to transaction details). However, issues like:

  • Fraud detection (asymmetric info: sellers may hide product quality).
  • Pricing transparency (buyers may not know fair prices for services). require eSewa to invest in verification systems (e.g., KYC checks) and dispute resolution (e.g., chargeback policies).

Information and Market Efficiency

Markets work best when information is complete and symmetric (all parties have equal access). When information is asymmetric (one party knows more), inefficiencies arise:

  • Adverse selection: Sellers with poor-quality goods drive out high-quality sellers (e.g., used cars market).
  • Moral hazard: One party takes risks knowing the other bears the cost (e.g., insurance fraud).
  • Search costs: Time and effort spent finding information (e.g., comparing Daraz vs. Amazon prices).
Quantity of Loans (Millions)Interest Rate (%)ODemand (D)Supply (S)Adverse Selection (Hidden Quality)Efficient Market (Symmetric Info)Q*P*Inefficient Market (Asymmetric Info)Q**P**
Adverse selection in Nepal’s loan market: How asymmetric information reduces loan volume (Q* → Q**) and raises interest rates (P* → P**).

Visual: Information Asymmetry in Nepal’s Loan Market

Example: Nabil Bank uses credit scoring models (based on digital footprints like mobile transactions) to reduce asymmetric information, lowering default rates in urban areas.


Digital Platforms and Information Economics

Digital platforms (e.g., Google, Facebook, Pathao) monopolize information flows, creating both efficiencies and market distortions.

021.2542.563.7585Urban Areas85Rural Areas30Internet Penetration (%)
Nepal’s digital divide (2023): Urban vs. rural internet access (source: NTC). **Note:** Rural areas lack symmetric information access, worsening market ineffici

How Platforms Use Information Economics

Platform Information Good Provided Economic Mechanism Used Real-World Impact
Google Search results Network effects + Data monetization Dominates 90% of global search traffic.
WhatsApp Messaging service Non-rivalry (free for users) 1B+ users; revenue from business API.
Pathao Ride-matching algorithm Dynamic pricing (surge pricing during traffic) Reduces empty rides via info sharing.
eSewa Digital payment records Transaction verification (reduces fraud) 80% of Nepal’s digital payments.

Contemporary Issues in Nepal

Nepal’s digital economy faces information-related challenges:

  1. Digital Divide: Rural areas lack access to high-speed internet, limiting info symmetry.
  2. Cybersecurity Risks: Asymmetric info between hackers and users (e.g., phishing scams on Khalti).
  3. Regulatory Gaps: NTC and Ncell must balance net neutrality (equal info access) with platform monopolies (e.g., Facebook’s dominance in ads).
2015NTC introducesspectrum auction rules2018Khalti launchesUPI integration, reduc2020COVID-19accelerates digital pa2023NTC proposes netneutrality regulations
Key milestones in Nepal’s information economy policy timeline.
20142015201620172018201920202021202220231020304050607080xDigital Payments (Rs. Billion)Cash Transactions (Rs. Billion)
Nepal’s shift from cash to digital payments (2015–2022). **Key Insight:** Digital payments reduce search costs and improve information symmetry for transactions

Visual: Nepal’s Internet Penetration Gap


Exam Tip

This unit is conceptual but heavily tested in TU exams. Expect:

  1. Definitions: Be ready to explain non-rivalry, non-excludability, and asymmetric information with examples.
  2. Comparisons: Draw tables (like above) comparing traditional vs. information goods.
  3. Real-World Applications: Link concepts to Nepali platforms (eSewa, Khalti, NTC) or global firms (Google, WhatsApp).
  4. Diagrams: Sketch supply/demand curves for digital goods (e.g., why e-books have inelastic demand).
  5. Case Studies: Analyze how information failures (e.g., fraud in Daraz) are mitigated by tech (e.g., AI reviews).
Quantity (Units)Price (Rs.)ODemand (D)Profit-Maximizing OutputQ*P*
Digital good pricing: Why e-books have near-zero marginal cost but high fixed costs (e.g., eSewa’s transaction fees).

Common Mistake: Students often confuse non-rivalry (many can use) with non-excludability (hard to stop non-payers). Always give examples!


In the Real World

  1. WhatsApp’s Free Model

    • Idea Used: Non-rivalry + network effects.
    • How: WhatsApp offers free messaging because the marginal cost of sending a message is near-zero. Its value grows exponentially with each new user (network effect), justifying its acquisition by Facebook for $19B.
  2. Daraz’s Dynamic Pricing

    • Idea Used: Asymmetric information + demand forecasting.
    • How: Daraz adjusts prices in real-time based on inventory and user location. For example, during Dashain, demand for diyas spikes, and Daraz’s algorithm raises prices dynamically to balance supply and demand.
  3. NTC’s Spectrum Auctions

    • Idea Used: Information goods pricing + regulatory intervention.
    • How: NTC auctions telecom spectrum (an information-intensive good) to Ncell and NTC. The auction design ensures efficient pricing by revealing true demand (via bids) and preventing collusion.

Based on the TU BIM syllabus for Economics of Information and Communication (IT230), unit 1.

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