IT230 Economics of Information and Communication

Economics of Information and CommunicationUnit 18 min read

Info Economics: Definitions, Scope & Key Concepts

Unit 1 of Economics of Information and Communication introduces information economics as a subfield of microeconomics, defining its scope, distinguishing information goods from physical goods, and analyzing their unique economic characteristics, market failures, and policy implications.

TAKEAWAYS:

  • Information economics studies how information is produced, distributed, and valued in markets, focusing on its unique properties (non-rivalry, high fixed costs, etc.).
  • Information goods differ from physical goods in cost structure, pricing strategies, and market behavior (e.g., zero marginal cost after production).
  • Market failures in information economics arise from asymmetric information, externalities, and public good characteristics, requiring government intervention.
  • Digital platforms (e.g., eSewa, WhatsApp) rely on network effects and economies of scale, while telecom regulators (NTC) address natural monopolies in ICT.
  • Policy tools like subsidies, taxes, and regulations shape ICT adoption (e.g., Nepal’s broadband expansion).
  • The unit bridges microeconomic theory (supply/demand) with real-world ICT markets (e.g., app pricing, data privacy laws).

1. What is Information Economics?

Information economics is the study of how information is created, distributed, and consumed in markets, and how it affects economic decisions. Unlike traditional economics (which focuses on tangible goods like wheat or cars), it examines:

  • Digital goods (software, e-books, music streams).
  • Services (telecom, cloud storage, online education).
  • Data (user behavior analytics, AI training datasets).

Key Definitions

Term Definition Example
Information Good A product whose value lies in its content (not physical form). Netflix shows, WhatsApp messages, eSewa transaction records.
Information Economy An economy where information and knowledge drive production and trade. Silicon Valley tech firms, Nepal’s fintech (Khalti, eSewa).
Digital Economy Subset of info economy where digital technologies enable transactions (e.g., blockchain). Cryptocurrency trading, NEPSE’s online share platform.

Why Study Information Economics?

  • Market failures: Information goods often lead to underproduction (e.g., free-rider problem in Wikipedia) or overproduction (e.g., spam emails).
  • Regulatory challenges: How to tax digital services? (e.g., Nepal’s 15% VAT on online transactions).
  • Global trends: 90% of Nepal’s GDP growth now comes from digital services (ITB, 2023).

2. Information Goods vs. Physical Goods

Information goods have unique economic properties that differ from physical goods (e.g., rice, smartphones). Compare:

QuantityCost (₹)OMarginal Cost (MC)Average Cost (AC)Fixed CostQ=1FC
Typical cost structure for an information good (e.g., digital textbook)
classDiagram
    class PhysicalGood {
        +Tangible
        +Perishable (e.g., food)
        +High marginal cost
        +Rivalrous (one person’s use reduces availability)
    }
    class InformationGood {
        +Intangible (bits/bytes)
        +Non-perishable (e.g., software)
        +High fixed cost, near-zero marginal cost
        +Non-rivalrous (one user’s access doesn’t limit others)
    }
    PhysicalGood --> "Contrast" InformationGood : "Key Differences"

Key Differences

Feature Physical Goods Information Goods
Cost Structure High marginal cost High fixed cost, near-zero marginal cost
Rivalry Rivalrous Non-rivalrous (e.g., streaming)
Excludability Easy to exclude Hard to exclude (piracy risk)
Example Wheat, cars YouTube videos, e-books

Worked Example: eSewa’s Transaction Costs

  • Fixed Cost: Developing the app, servers, and security (~$5M one-time).
  • Marginal Cost: Processing a $10 transaction = $0.01 (near-zero).
  • Pricing Strategy: eSewa charges 1.99% per transaction (not per unit cost).

3. Market Failures in Information Economics

Information goods often lead to market inefficiencies due to:

  1. Public Good Problem: Non-excludable and non-rivalrous goods (e.g., open-source software) are underfunded.
  2. Asymmetric Information: Sellers know more than buyers (e.g., hidden fees in Daraz orders).
  3. Network Externalities: Value depends on user base (e.g., WhatsApp’s dominance).
  4. Free-Rider Problem: Users consume without paying (e.g., pirated movies).

Visual: Market Failure Types

Public Good (e.g., open-source software) (30%)Asymmetric Information (e.g., telecom pricing) (25%)Network Effects (e.g., social media platforms) (20%)Free-Rider Problem (e.g., pirated content) (15%)Other (e.g., regulatory capture) (10%)
Market failures in ICT sectors (percentage distribution)

Real-World Example: Nepal’s Telecom Market

  • Problem: Ncell and NTC face high fixed costs (tower infrastructure) but near-zero marginal cost per call.
  • Solution: Regulated pricing to prevent monopolies (e.g., capped call rates).

4. Government Intervention Tools

To correct market failures, governments use:

Tool Example in Nepal/ICT Effect
Subsidies Free Wi-Fi in public spaces (Kathmandu) Increases digital inclusion
Taxes 15% VAT on online transactions (eSewa) Reduces free-riding
Regulation NTC’s spectrum allocation rules Prevents monopolies (e.g., Ncell vs. NTC)
Public Provision Nepal Government’s e-Governance portal Provides free digital services

5. Information Economics in Nepal’s ICT Sector

Case Study: NEPSE’s Online Trading Platform

  • Problem: Traditional stock trading had high transaction costs and asymmetric info (brokers hid fees).
  • Solution: NEPSE’s digital platform reduced costs and improved transparency.
  • Impact:
    • 2022: 60% of trades were digital (vs. 10% in 2015).
    • Cost saving: ~$2 per trade (from $10 to $8).

Data Visualization: Nepal’s Digital Adoption (2010–2023)

201020122014201620182020202220241020304050607080xInternet Users (%)Mobile Money Users (%)E-Commerce Sales (₹ Billion)
Nepal’s digital adoption trends (2010–2023) with e-commerce sales in ₹ billion (right axis)

## In the Real World

  1. eSewa & Khalti (Digital Payments)

    • Idea Used: Non-rivalrous good (one transaction doesn’t limit another) + network effects (more users → more merchants).
    • How? eSewa’s fixed cost (app development) is recovered via percentage fees, not per-transaction costs.
  2. WhatsApp (Network Economics)

    • Idea Used: Network externality (more users → higher value).
    • How? WhatsApp is free because its value comes from user density, not direct payments.
  3. NTC’s Telecom Regulation

    • Idea Used: Natural monopoly (high fixed costs for towers) + price regulation.
    • How? NTC caps prices to prevent Ncell/NTC from exploiting near-zero marginal costs.

## Exam Tip

  1. Define clearly: Start answers with precise definitions (e.g., "Information goods are non-rivalrous, intangible products...").
  2. Compare tables: Always contrast physical vs. info goods or market failures in tables.
  3. Use Nepal examples: Examiners love eSewa, NTC, NEPSE, or Pathao in answers.
  4. Draw diagrams: Sketch supply/demand curves for digital goods (e.g., zero marginal cost line).
  5. Policy focus: Link concepts to Nepal’s ICT policies (e.g., "The government uses subsidies to address the free-rider problem in digital education.").

Final Note: Information economics is not just theory—it explains why WhatsApp is free, how eSewa makes money, and why NTC regulates telecom prices. Master these real-world ties for full marks!

Based on the TU BITM syllabus for Economics of Information and Communication (IT230), unit 1.

Discussion

Loading…